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thinker. But where does the interest in this topic arise from? What is making the 
question of discontinuity into a reading line of promise to get to Foucault's work?  
Since the so-called archaeological period of his work, Foucault caused concern 
among its readers to clearly oppose an idea of history understood as a progressive and 
linear accumulation of moments that tend to be summarized in a final telos of 
meaning, rather, describe as traversed by jumps that make any causal or continuous 
explanation of events impossible. Such discontinuity prevented any sense from 
conferring the historical course. In the case of The Order of Things (1970), a book in 
which the succession of one episteme to another (from the classical age to the 
Renaissance, and thus to modernity) does not support to be seen as a progressive step 
rules discursive to more effective to describe reality, but involves abrupt breaks in the 
deep layers that each time makes it possible for the emergence of discourses of truth. 
Foucault reaffirmed this idea in the so-called genealogical period, when he adheres to 
Nietzsche's vision of history marked by breakdowns occurred by the struggle of 
performing forces in search of dominion (cf. Foucault, 1984). However, one wonders 
whether the issue of discontinuity only appears in the context of the reflection of 
Foucault on history or if it occupies other places in the author's work, if it is only 
marginal or if it constitutes a vein which runs on his philosophical reflection (cf. 
Foucault, 1977).  
Edgardo Castro recognizes the importance of the issue by stating that: 
 
Foucault does not address the history of knowledge in terms of continuity but 
discontinuity. Therefore, instead of being handled in terms of evolution, from what it 
anticipates and what it does, it does so in terms of rupture. Foucault wonders, in fact, about 
what makes certain things possible in a given time. Conditions of possibility of knowledge 
are conditions at the level of concurrency (2004: 56). 
 
This thinker introduces the theme of discontinuity as an important reference in the 
texts of Foucault. It is true that Castro establishes a clear relationship between the 
discontinuity and the treatment that the French philosopher makes history against the 
grain of a modern vision where history has a fundamental feature, continuity, that is 
events are concatenated to form a compact, orderly and gradual result. In the 
vocabulary of Michel Foucault (2004), Castro stops quickly at the notion of 
discontinuity (a term which according to his count appears about 128 times in the 
Foucauldian corpus, unlike, for example, that of history where it appears 4687 times). 
This comparison suggests we are already interested in highlighting the interest in the 
issue of discontinuity, which although somewhat understated, 
Meanwhile, Judith Revel has conducted a reading of Foucault's work inspired by 
the discontinuity as a key to reading the French writer. “The issue of discontinuity, 
that is, both the rejection of continuity and linear representation of history as, in 
general terms, in epistemological models that make continuity a piece of heritage is at 
the core work of Foucault” (2009: 49). Revel assumes that the discontinuity is a key 
notion in both Foucault's critique of the notion of history and the epistemological 
models. His attraction to the discontinuity would have led Foucault to give a new 
treatment to the notion of history as well as the notion of power. In my opinion, Revel 
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fails to describe his internal architecture, that is, he does not describe how the 
background theme of the discontinuity gives its shape to the whole of Foucault’s 
work; however, this author makes an important contribution to not being content to 
point out that the discontinuity is a central theme addressed by Foucault, but sees in 
discontinuity a feature of the French philosopher’s thought. Something like that 
discontinuity, unless under study, is its method or way of thinking. So the question 
that arises is: what is the discontinuity for Foucault? Could it be taken as a key 
concept for understanding the method of archeology or genealogy used by Foucault? 
How would this method of discontinuity work or function? How does this explain 
how Foucault establishes the historical cuts in his analysis, a matter that raised 
controversy at that time? Is this attention to the discontinuity in the way work is 
noticed and studied, for example? And is it a particular and peculiar way of thinking 
rooted in all the philosophical itinerary of the French thinker? 
The two above references show us that this is a research project that can 
determine many features of Foucault. Above all, they confirm that the issue of 
discontinuity deserves special attention. In the following, I will leave these questions 
aside for the time being and I will concentrate on identifying how the issue of 
discontinuity arises in the initial period of philosophical itinerary of Foucault (1962-
1969), particularly in the context of his reflections on history. So at first, a sketch will 
be done about his conception of history from the book The Order of Things, then 
relate it to the discontinuity. In the second stage, I will shift my attention to 
archaeological method, considering what has been pointed out. 
 
 
1.  The discontinuity in historical analysis 
 
The Orden of Things is divided into two blocks and the first is the analysis of The 
Meninas of Velasquez. In this analysis, Foucault describes the complexity of views 
and positions in that painting and suggests the way of analysis and what he will seek 
to demonstrate in the following chapters: each period has its own peculiar way of 
thinking about things; In other words, each period of history has its own conditions to 
surface the truth of its discourses, what will later be accepted or not. In the analysis of 
the conditions as knowledge arises, the French thinker argues that these change over 
time, they are totally variable. For Foucault, it is of sudden twists, breaks and changes 
from one period to another. In the remaining part of the first block and throughout the 
second, Foucault is dedicated to arguing the episteme changes that occur in each 
period, through the Renaissance, the Classical period and ending its analysis in 
modern times. Then, there are two questions that are central to The Order of Things: 
on one hand, the notion of episteme and secondly, the description of three epistemes 
that occur between periods of the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Foucault speaks, on the other hand, of archeology (as the subtitle of The Order of 
Things says: An archeology of the human sciences) to refer to the method with which 
it discusses the history of the human sciences, as it seeks to reveal the epistemological 
forms that at a certain time governing the organization and appearance of all scientific 
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discourses which then become part of a knowledge as such, that is, certain status of 
what we know today as human sciences. In this sense, the French thinker understands 
episteme as the hidden conditions of possibility that intervened for the emergence of 
such discourses. Revealing these epistemological forms is a method that departs from 
employing the conventional story, stopping Foucault in the manifestations of the same 
speeches and even more, away from scientific historiography. However, the 
epistemological forms, or episteme, is the science of what determines the issues, the 
problems, the intrinsic debates of an era. In that perspective, what Foucault discovers 
is that the story of speeches to would be characterized by a succession of episteme to 
know each historical period characterized by internal rules. The episteme is unique 
and determines its own speeches, limits the boundaries between speeches and also 
channels the ideas of knowledge and reflection that has made it possible. Episteme is, 
then, “set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give 
rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 191). And, who knows all of this? Who can define the scope of an episteme? 
Who can analyze the consciousness of a historical moment? Who can diagnose the 
formation of an episteme between centuries? Foucault says, “Awareness is the 
privilege of the archaeologist episteme” (Burgelin, Revault and Amiot, 1970: 151). 
Therefore, the archaeologist, who is Foucault, offers a study of episteme of three 
periods: the Renaissance episteme, the Classical era and modernity. 
Now, The Order of Things identifies the transformation of Western rationality 
between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries on their way through the three 
epistemes mentioned above. What Foucault seeks to counteract in this analysis is the 
idea of historical continuity, that is, the idea of a cumulative history of historical 
events that runs linear and unidirectional as well as describing its progress. The 
novelty that brings The Order of Things lies precisely in determining that there is no 
single coherent story touring several periods that find and describe the progress of a 
period to the next. It is not a process, covering the three epistemes, which describe a 
horizontal discourse that proceeds in a peaceful and absolute way. When Foucault 
shows the process, the relationship and the distinction of episteme to another does not 
find any explanation to the transition from one to another, either in a progressive 
perspective or progresses slowly toward the same point. The history of speeches of 
knowledge and the history of the human sciences, a subject that Foucault addresses 
has nothing of a positivist vision that would burn steps towards a progressive 
maturation process and lucidity of reason. It is more complex because the question is: 
The Order of Things describes the passage of three epistemes. In each there is an 
internal story, the story of an episteme; each episteme expressed in thoughts and 
language. Three epistemes were divided in two great breaks. 
Renaissance episteme had a close relationship with language: “that nature, in 
itself, is an unbroken tissue of words and signs, of accounts and characters, of 
discourse and forms” (Foucault, 1970: 44). The world, language, knowledge and 
wisdom were dominated in this period by the similarity. Knowledge in this period had 
three channels of expression: orality, commentary and interpretation, these being 
ways of understanding knowledge. However, in the sixteenth century language, 
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according to Foucault, could not have direct contact with reality which has led in this 
period to discuss possible “approaches”. 
In the similarity, there are two figures who tried to bring knowledge to reality: the 
madman and the poet. The madman, from his madness, came to reality, wanted to 
understand it, penetrating more and more with his movements, his gestures toward the 
world. Likewise, the poet, with his rhymes and verses, tried to approach and have a 
full experience of the present moment. Don Quixote makes reality his own and above 
all, eliminates the distance that the poet and the madman have been carrying. How 
does he do it? Through language. The language in this period is the one that speaks, 
the more you talk, the closer you will be to approach reality; the manifestation of 
talkativeness, of speech through language. The language of Don Quixote was the 
fullness of similarity; resemblance to reality, so that he could know about reality, 
“Don Quixote’s adventures form the boundary: they mark the end of the old interplay 
between resemblance and signs and contain the beginnings of new relations. Don 
Quixote is not a man given to extravagance, but rather a diligent pilgrim breaking his 
journey before all the marks of similitude” (Foucault, 1970: 51). 
Who is Don Quixote? For Foucault, he was the bridge between one episteme and 
the other. It is the character of Don Quixote who will bring the similarity to the limit, 
“Don Quixote is a true likeness of all the signs that he has traced from his book” 
(1970: 52), and with the Renaissance period; the new episteme of the Classical era 
will be the representation, leaving aside and breaking the line that he had drawn first. 
From the Renaissance to the Classical era, a change occurs: the language no 
longer speaks, now it analyzes the episteme of order and classification. “Since no 
approximations are made, it is discerned” (Burgelin et al., 1970: 39). From the 
similarity through representation, there was a step to talk about the order: “the 
possibility of establishing an ordered succession between things, even non-
measurable ones” (1970: 63). This was the desire to capture the mechanical and 
calculable in nature. It is an application of the well-known mathesis universalis, that 
is, a logic, a kind of look, a form of analysis, a way of speaking was in force and 
paced throughout this period: the order, and in his hand, empirical domains were 
guided by mechanics and geometry. Here Foucault analyzed the representation from 
order through three sciences: general grammar, natural history and analysis of wealth. 
Replacing the similarity, representation is found: language understood reality through 
representations. How does he do it? Through grammar, history and natural wealth. 
Now, in this period of the Classical era, Foucault analyzed the general grammar, 
natural history and the analysis of the riches, thinking that sensible realities are 
figurative. These sciences are the figure of the sensible world. From this, it follows 
that even under the same figures in the world, discourse always pretended to be 
ordered. Thus, Foucault foreshadowed what would later be called a discourse of 
order. Now, is it the man who ordered the knowledge of this period? Even the figure 
of man still lives in the shadow. Here man enters an ambiguous position, in the sense 
that he is the subject of knowledge and, at the same time, the subject that knows. The 
ambiguity lies precisely in the fact that man is the crucial and central point of all 
reflection and, above all, is the author. 
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Juliette and Justine, by Sade, like Don Quixote in the Renaissance, closes one 
period and another open; the Classical era was closed and modernity was opened. 
Both works had the function of hinged works. Sade's speech led to its logical 
representation. What sense did it make? The writings of Sade describing the brutality 
and licentiousness of his characters did not intend to represent the actions of an 
imaginary world, but to overcome them: the acts of their profligate lies on one hand, 
the destruction of writing itself and on the other hand, the destruction of man. This 
destruction was the full significance of the attempt to overcome the representation. 
The letters of Sade called things by their name; He did not lack, therefore, to follow 
the lines drawn by the representation; It was enough with what Sade wrote about man, 
gradually the destruction of the representation itself was felt, or at least its 
consummation, “So that the great narrative of Juliette’s life reveals, throughout the 
desire, violence, savagery, and death, the glittering table of representation” (Foucault, 
1970, p. 229). It did not lack the words to represent the imagination of man and his 
relationship with reality. The writing, in the Sade a style, obfuscated representation 
and thus spoke the unvarnished reality.  
The nineteenth century, the century of modern episteme, clung to the story in such 
a way that replaced the order, this notion that was in effect in the previous two age. In 
modern times, or in modern episteme, science acquired new characteristics and thus 
open the way to rigorous scientific approach, “the effort made to provide them with 
both a philosophical foundation and a formal justification; the endeavour to purify, 
formalize, and possibly mathematicize the domains of economics, biology, and finally 
linguistics itself” (Foucault, 1970: 267). 
The episteme of the modern era defined the birth of man. The eternal man did not 
exist since the dawn of humanity. It is not man who always lived human sciences but, 
on the contrary, for Foucault it was modern episteme that made man a definite object. 
The most characteristic feature of this episteme was the discovery of a shadow that 
lived in anonymity, which was far from all anthropology that behind every science 
has always existed and there will exist an unconscious space, an unknown root. What 
is the theme of this episteme? The emergence of the unconscious knowledge. The 
progressive growth of the story is a lie, it is the “best known yet least recognized lie, 
to affirm that the very continuity of the movement of reason since the Renaissance is 
no more than an illusion of optics” (Burgelin et al., 1970: 53). 
After analyzing the drawn lines that revolve around the episteme, we could notice 
the breaks and ruptures that occurred in previous centuries with regard to the 
emergence of a knowledge. However, the development of the speeches is a historical 
question. At this time, we conduct research around the question of discontinuity as a 
feature of history. Is it possible that Foucault's historical analysis is based on the 
discontinuity? Is the discontinuity a feature of the story itself and in what way does it 
reveal the movement of the episteme? This is the question I intend to analyze now. 
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2.  Discontinuity as a trait of history 
 
To advance in this work, I need to define a type of questions that I want to 
answer. How does discontinuity work in the historical analysis? How does it work in 
relation from one period to another? And finally, how do you study this object of 
survey in The Order of Things: the story of discourses of knowledge? 
Foucault essentially does not describe the way or what happens so that one 
episteme is passed on to another. Or, how do these jumping process occur? 
Archeology offers no explanation of these processes (cf. Burgelin et al., 1970). But, 
what separates a period of another if not the same episteme? Foucault explains the 
episteme as a dispersion space, “a simultaneous set of specific remanences” (Aaron 
and Foucault, 2008: 50). It is possible to see more clearly the difference from one 
period to another, where an episteme can change or mutate, but not why such changes 
occur in that way. 
So why do we tend to think that Foucault is a discontinuist? Around 1969, 
Foucault had an interview with the sociologist Raymond Aron, who asked the 
following question: “In what structure of thought, or in what episteme, are you?” 
Foucault replied: 
 
First, the discontinuity. Discontinuity is, of course, a very serious problem, and you know 
well that it is a problem that is posed to historians. The problem of periodization arises in 
economic history as well as social history. There is no reason why historians of ideas are 
delayed from the methodological point of view with regard to economic historians or 
societies. In the field of ideas, periodization problems arise and this periodization is relative to 
the level at which we place ourselves and the object chosen.... I have the vanity having set, I 
think for the first time, the synchronous continuity, the simultaneity relations that existed 
between epistemological fields as diverse as the study of language, the study of economics 
and the study of biology. I bought a discontinuity at the price of a continuity or vice versa, as 
you prefer (Aaron and Foucault, 2008: 22).  
 
Foucault's view, given to Aaron, directly serves to understand directly history-
discontinuity relationship. Again the previous question: why do I tend to think that 
Foucault is a discontinuist? The answer is clear: Foucault is in the structure of thought 
of discontinuity. However, as he himself acknowledges, discontinuity is a problem, A 
problem that is mainly posed to historians, in what way? Historians generally have 
tried to erase or to forget the discontinuity, in as much as they are describing the 
historical courts and try in the same way the relationship from one period to another, 
thinking that there is an ongoing relationship between these. They also are omitting 
that there is a space and a break devoid of relationship. The intent of the historians, 
therefore, is to erase the discontinuity, to show, on the contrary, that there is an 
internal logic that runs from one period necessarily to the next. They seek to 
overcome discontinuity by determining an underlying continuity. But what does 
Foucault mean by saying synchronous continuity? How do you understand your claim 
that bought a discontinuity at the price of a continuity? To answer both questions one 
must refer to the analysis of the episteme that has been described.  
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In modern episteme, for example, Foucault describes the development of biology, 
economics, etc. At first glance, these sciences have no relation to one another; 
however, the finding of Foucault, his synchronic continuity, is to have determined that 
among these sciences it is possible to locate some relation in the way they produce 
knowledge. That is to say, how or the way biology produces knowledge resembles the 
way it is produced by the economy, among these sciences there are rules, perhaps 
bridges, which act, as Foucault, in an invisible way. On the other hand, this internal 
continuity that appears in an episteme following the sciences and their peculiar 
relationships are distinct and totally different if they are compared between one 
episteme and another. There is a radical discontinuity in the way of producing 
knowledge between the three epistemes from the 16th to the 19th century. In that sense, 
can the discontinuity express itself clearly away from the misunderstanding so far 
drawn? Is it possible to solve the riddle about what makes sprout a gap in the ground 
of the history leading to the succession, to the emergence of the unknown?  
The centerpiece of the story that is described in The Order of Things, one might 
say, has two vectors: the empirical and positivist. Understanding the empirical and 
practices from the speeches of knowing, which is, all processed empirical exercises 
that are based discourse. The positivist side, on the other hand, describes the 
theorizing that the same book interweaves from the concepts located in history. In this 
sense, the history described by Foucault is attempting to register in history, in the 
course of history, various forms of appearance of empirical or practical formulas and 
the relationship they have with their respective theories, among them all mutations 
that have suffered in these movements analyzing their respective historical a priori. 
However, to carry out his historical analysis, Foucault defines its space of analysis. It 
describe the occurrences of different knowledge from the 16th century, which were 
deployed to the three domains that are represented in the work, life and language. His 
analysis points out, then, the language with which it has been possible to understand 
“as it were – language as it has been spoken, natural creatures as they have been 
perceived and grouped together” (1970: 23), and the formation in which such 
language was born, or said languages, formed by means of codes, all of them from 
order. Therefore, among the knowledge that lies from the 16th century and in the 
formation of language must exist a code of knowledge, a possible systematic that 
regulates all birth, which regulates the birth of empiricities and positivities. 
In that sense, The Order of Things seeks to find the starting point in which 
language, discourses and practices or empirical forms were born, in such a way that 
the history would be the identification of a mode or always random order which are 
subject of praxis. To determine the peculiar way of its principle of existence, “its 
laws, its regularity living beings, their representative value chain and the words must 
change” (Foucault, 1970: 23). In other words, according to the commentator Morey, it 
is to seek and follow in the footsteps of mutations “of the empirical in the empirical 
field” and “of theoretical in the theoretical field” (Morey, 1983: 231) or, as 
understood by Descombes, “[Foucault] seeks the evolution of the concepts and 
thought in the documents which are the different states of the different knowledge” 
(1982: 138). To carry out an analysis of what is visibly clandestine in a hidden way, 
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above all, analyzing the existence of an idea of order that has led to organize and sort 
it all: that is the task of Foucault, as an archaeologist. 
What does the archaeologist do before history? Their task is to explain how 
during a given time, 16th to 19th centuries, a knowledge were ordained, thus falling in 
the order of the speeches, their variations and from it came the way to make way to 
different knowledge (analysis of language reached linguistic), whose analyzes are 
marked by the historical conditions of possibility that have enabled their birth. In all 
this, the archaeologist has another more important task, developments, changes from 
one topic to another should not be described in their historical analysis, that is to say, 
the archaeologist does not develop a scheme wherein each occurrence of a follow the 
precedent speech is not a history of discursive appearances systematically, either 
continuous or discontinuous. But the task of the archaeologist is to identify historical 
priori, by which “ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected 
in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon 
afterwards” (Foucault, 1970: 23). Well, what the archaeologist does is a sort of 
excavation of an epistemological field, an episteme that analyzing its possibilities, 
brings to light the reasons and motives for which this has been formed in this way and 
not another. 
Then, what Foucault avoided was the linear analysis of the knowledge (as 
presented by science or conventional history), where the history of knowledge is 
described in an increasingly way and moved toward their gradual perfection, 
assuming as a result of the above a final telos. To what they take their interests as an 
archaeologist, instead, it is to the analysis of the depth of the epistemic spaces, always 
ordered in that way they were made in an episteme, which govern and determine 
changes in the theoretical discourse and practical, discourses or knowledge. In that 
sense, it is in this way that Foucault demonstrates his remoteness from the logic of 
conventional historical analysis. So the history is not historical, it is not becoming 
continuous, it is, on the contrary, a history without telos, without linear time (cf. 
Descombes, 1982). For the French thinker, it is a history describing the space of 
knowledge configurations of certain episteme, but not linked in a global and a one-
way process. Therefore, archeology is the result of the explanation of the conditions 
of possibility of a knowledge. 
The Order of Things then performed an analysis of history where it is not possible 
to see history as the rational deployment of a historical becoming, going on from the 
Renaissance and ending with modernity. However, the place where can situate the 
history described in the archeology of the human sciences would be in the analysis of 
spaces, the ground on which speeches were born, and thus the archaeologist draws the 
limits to identify changes, ups and downs always inexplicable to the description. All 
the speeches of an era, for Foucault, should be studied “envisaged apart from all 
criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective forms” (1968: 23). The 
Speeches, far from being a coherent description of historical facts which by itself 
explain the development of these, must be described in the manner of the patient sum 
of partial facts that do not seek to be universal Now the issue of discontinuity, will not 
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only be referred to as a trait of history, but also as the trait of the archaeological 
method. 
 
 
3. The discontinuity as trait archaeological method 
 
How does the archaeological method works? How does it conduct its analysis? 
And what roads does it follow when they intend to describe their research about 
history? The book The archaeology of Knowledge, as many scholars have said, is the 
description of the implementation of investigations carried out by Foucault (Castro, 
1995; Morey, 1993; Diaz, 1993; Dreyfus, 1983). The French thinker said 
“[Archeology] it belongs to that field in which the questions of the human being, 
consciousness, origin, and the subject emerge, intersect, mingle, and separate of” 
(1972: 16). So what does archeology want? To find and diagnose various changes and 
ruptures by speeches of knowledge been known. Bert J. Francois, meanwhile, says: 
“The problem was for Foucault to know how to regroup elements sufficiently related 
so that there is more clarification on each other, but also sufficiently heterogeneous to 
allow deduction of an available connection” (cit. in: Burgelin et al, 1970: 29). In this 
regard, the method that exposes the archeology of knowledge is, somehow, the 
comparison. Comparing common and different elements, from that, to describe a 
valid system. 
While biology, economics and linguistics apparently had no contact, archeology 
allowed the composition of a valid system, beyond the apparent ruptures, continuities 
simultaneities or synchronic relationship. It should be asked Foucault about “how the 
fundamental discontinuity between the said two configurations of knowledge” (R. 
Aaron and Foucault, 2008: 44); as history or historical analysis to describe or analyze 
the relationship of one episteme to another will always be a fruitless activity: episteme 
have no relation next to each other. From the above, the distinction would be the 
second element of archaeological method. 
Things, language, speech sprout themselves to the surface, there is an “erosion of 
the outside” (cf. Foucault, 1991b: 31-33; Blanchot, 1987: 22). That is, a time will 
come when the researcher discovers a type of erosion that appear on the surface, in 
history. No need of more homework than patient waiting and accumulating 
information about the birth and subsequently changes of speech, the development of a 
speech from one period to another; although the emphasis falling on it is not possible 
an analysis of rigid and serious of these changes way: “this profound breach in the 
expanse of continuities, though it must be analysed, and minutely so, cannot be 
‘explained’ or even summed up in a single word. It is a radical event that is 
distributed across the entire visible surface of knowledge, and whose signs, shocks, 
and effects it is possible to follow step by step” (Foucault, 1970: 236). 
Now, the question is, how is the archaeological method set against an episteme? 
Let’s say, archaeologist will need to gather a wealth of information documents about 
a period. Archaeologist task will be to read and reread every possible thing at their 
fingertips: a scholar in terms of all knowledge. After the study, then starts the 
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selection work: reorganizes a certain item from the data collected. Search the subject 
or the statement, “first, because on the one hand it is linked to the gesture of writing 
or to the articulation of speech” (1972: 28), which is among its archaeological 
interest. Later, the carry out the analysis of the division: what themes emerge as a 
degree of importance: “making possible the whole episteme (...)possible is primarily 
the relation to a knowledge of order” (1970: 79). This is in question “to seek a 
foundation in those figures of knowledge in which they participate, and are the radical 
novelty of the age of man: the figures appearing and beginning their twilight in 
history” (1972: 337). What happens to an issue that is presented gradually but not 
essential? Here the task of the archaeologist is to point out the difference or 
subordination. There are issues or speeches that have passed from one side to another 
in history, not because speeches are not related, but because there were other speeches 
before them, or were the first to a lesser extent (cf. Foucault, 1972: 31-40). For all the 
lines developed above, 
References continue around the discontinuity as trait archaeological method 
which is offered in the archeology of knowledge in the light of the above. First, 
Foucault has taken the history of the human sciences as an archaeological theme, and 
speeches to know, in a historical perspective from archeology, is “a method of 
historical analysis freed from the anthropological theme” (1972: 16). Of Renaissance 
episteme to modern episteme, language has changed, has mutated so that it is pertinent 
to say that every era had a notion, more or less clear, of what was possible to talk 
about the idea that had the language and in which a knowledge is built, “reveal in all 
its purity the space in which discursive events are deployed (...) it is to leave oneself 
free to describe the interplay of relations within it and outside it” (1972: 29). It should 
here be noted that since the Renaissance to modernity inner sense that analyzed the 
story was to sort the knowledge: in the Renaissance, as we saw, by the similarity (not 
to confuse one thing has similarity with another, this time defined four modes 
convenience, emulation, analogy and affinity); in classical times knowledge was 
ordered by representation and modernity handle the unconscious space, the space of 
knowledge, where language says nothing of himself, but his knowledge is oriented 
toward science: all our knowledge is determined by a language that controls, 
educates, governs and determines it.  
Foucault always kept the idea that does not explain his work, specifically as 
regards their method. The iterative test is the lack of information about how to explain 
the trance, the change, the breakup of an episteme to another. Foucault “constantly 
underscores discontinuities between its historical blocks” (Merquior, 1985: 39). The 
circle of epistemology addressed in a letter to Foucault 1968 in response to the 
publication of their books and they generate misunderstandings. “What is the engine 
that transforms one configuration to another?” (Burgelin et al., 1970: 219), was the 
question of the circle of epistemology. 
Foucault responded to the circle of epistemology. French thinker responses caused 
astonishment to all those readers, as that would become the main lines of his 
forthcoming book The archaeology of Knowledge. For now I will outline briefly some 
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of the answers given by the French thinker, moving to call the question of 
archaeological method before history and discontinuity. 
Obviously, among the configuration of a period and another there is a 
discontinuity. The question of discontinuity in Foucault underwent a change of status, 
a profound change against the conception that history had it. For history, the issue of 
discontinuity was what the historian had an obligation to get rid of history, and could 
well be explained that task from two words of the given and the unthinkable. First, all 
questions about institutions, theories and practices reflect what is given, this set that 
can be perceived, and it is possible to study, analyze and, especially, register. This is 
reflected in society, in culture, in the sense that they are theories and practices 
available to the historian. Secondly, theories and practices that occur in the same way 
in society and culture, but they correspond to be anonymous, subjective and 
unfounded reflect the unthinkable. The historian must face it, as we said, the 
unthinkable delete history so that it does not come to surface, and therefore cannot 
appear. Indeed, given the history, the continuous and discontinuous is unthinkable. In 
that sense, below the discontinuity, continuity circulated illegally. The French thinker 
will move away from this conception of discontinuity, to give another sense. Foucault 
will say: “Discontinuity was the stigma of temporal dislocation that it was the 
historian's task to remove from history” (1972: 8). But everything was changing in 
that look, and this brought the discontinuity is the key, important basic element to 
carry out a historical analysis. Foucault, so I just said, always showed an interest 
about discontinuity as important element. 
First, imbued in the archaeological look, the historian must define their scope of 
analysis to distinguish the possible levels of analysis and, above all, determine what 
period is the one you want. Second, what interests the historian is to discover all 
possible limits of development of the theme that has been proposed to analyze, “the 
limits of oscillation, the threshold performance” (Burgelin et al., 1970: 223). Finally, 
thirdly, the role of discontinuity does razor, cutting through the middle and separating 
two knowledge within a positive area, on the contrary, in each period, in each domain, 
each level takes a form and a function. In short, the discontinuity is instrument and 
under investigation; Foucault explains the above as follows: “[Discontinuity] allows 
to individualize the domains, but it can only be set by comparing these domains; not 
broken units, but to establish new ones; Scan series and split levels; and (...) it is not 
simply a concept present in the discourse of the historian, but it secretly, what is” 
(Foucault, 2012: 227). 
Discontinuity, then, goes beyond being a simple gap between two spaces or 
historical moments; It is in each separation of facts or events, analyzes what 
disassociated with the preceding, their task is comparison, “it can only be established 
by comparing”. All the historian's task, then, is a task implicitly discontinuous “away 
from vast unities like 'periods' or 'centuries' to the phenomena of rupture, of 
discontinuity” (Foucault, 1972: 4). We have been describing the continuity and 
discontinuity as simultaneous features of history, is it possible to see the continuity as 
visible and discontinuity as the invisible that story? Is it outrageous to suggest that 
continuity can be analyzed as the conscious and the discontinuity as the unconscious? 
Osman Daniel Choque Aliaga 
“The discontinuity in the continuity”.  
Michel Foucault and the archaeological period 
 
44 
 
 
In an interview entitled Truth and power (Verite et pouvoir), says the French 
thinker about the discontinuity: 
 
This business about discontinuity has always rather bewildered me. In the new edition of 
the Petit Larousse it says: 'Foucault: a philosopher who founds his theory of history on 
discontinuity'. That leaves me flabbergasted. No doubt I didn't make myself sufficiently clear 
in The Order of Things, though I said a good deal there about this question. It seemed to me 
that in certain empirical forms of knowledge like biology, political economy, psychiatry, 
medicine etc., the rhythm of transformation doesn't follow the smooth, continuist schemas of 
development which are normally accepted. (1980: 111-112). 
 
According to Canguilhem, the contribution of Foucault's work was to discover the 
unconscious discourse of the West, which was behind all knowledge of modern 
society: “But his trenchant objections often routine responses, not only constituted a 
defense, but also, most of the time, fulminant lighting his forays into the unconscious 
knowledge, their questions and answers” (Burgelin et al., 1970: 77). History, in this 
sense, is the conscious process: the continuities not parceled, long chains, prolonged 
analysis of men, their words and gestures. And the discontinuity is the unconscious 
process: studying the always hidden, dark, why it is possible to look at all that space, 
all that continuous horizon, all that dawn of consciousness reasons, totalizing whole 
story that emanates from it. Suspicion of the unconscious to consciousness is 
confirmed once again: “when history does not offer enough security is the evolution 
of thought, of knowledge, of knowledge, is the evolution of consciousness always 
close itself (...) that it is asked to save what must be saved” (Foucault, 2012: 226). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This research followed the intellectual journey of the French thinker from a 
broken key reading. Moving from the analysis of history as an object of study, and 
archeology, as a method of study, the period characterized as archaeological in 
Foucault's thought, I have outlined the key lines that support the claim that Foucault 
thought their journey intellectual from an inherent notion constantly marked by the 
issue of discontinuity; therefore, the issue of discontinuity is consequently dormant. 
We saw that the issue of discontinuity is located inseparably vision of history of 
French thinker, thus determining a way to understand and carry out a historiography. 
This has its peculiarities. In this analysis we can, as did Foucault, assign a name to an 
episteme to refer to some use it turned in a period, but what is not available to anyone 
who makes a historical analysis inspired by the French thinker is to understand why 
the various changes, sometimes even sudden, between episteme and another occur. 
The discontinuity is present in the failure, or impossible, to understand what reasons 
episteme served for the jump or move to the next. A discontinuity, therefore, which 
does not prohibit the historian form raising the differences between episteme, but 
leaves it in a total silence when there is an understanding to why there is a change 
towards each other. Therefore, we can say that, in the archaeological period, the issue 
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of discontinuity is linked to not explain the separation between each episteme, but 
respects obviously, some consistency in the internal movement, that is, there is no 
kind of discontinuity in the game, running or how they form knowledge in each 
period. In short, a discontinuity that accentuates general aspects. How? The theme of 
discontinuity helps to understand how knowledge have been ordered, its variations, 
within a period; as method compares common and different elements; distinguishes a 
knowledge as is different from another. All of the above within a period provided. 
Therefore, it is a discontinuity that respects the internal process in the formation of 
knowledge within each period, but manifested radical change period to another. That's 
one side. 
There is a fundamental contribution, I think, in understanding the issue of 
discontinuity in the archaeological period. Foucault introduced, then, in the analysis 
of history, discontinuity as the key to a deeper understanding of historiography, which 
must emerge following a set of clear facts and always hidden reasons. For a long time, 
some historical analysis sought to eliminate or get rid of discontinuity, as it was 
against a major interest to the filmmakers: continuity in their historical works. 
Foucault's contribution is to say that there is no need to make it disappear, because 
history is the result of continuous and discontinuous, conscious and unconscious 
analysis. 
Two are then axes in which the subject of discontinuity moves: the inability to 
explain the gap between periods other and essentially positive view of this issue in 
historiography. Through the development hitherto treated we can ensure that the issue 
of discontinuity occurs in the framework of its reflection on history from the 
archaeological method, that is, the discontinuity is a vein that runs through much 
reflection Foucault archaeological period. It should open a new question facing the 
second moment of Foucault's work, that is, against the family period before to 
conclude this work: what happens at that time, that is, the issue of discontinuity 
present in the family was in the period as archaeological or perhaps time is a marginal 
issue? We may not be satisfied. The above question requires a prompt response. 
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